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THE QUESTION OF RISK: INCORPORATING
COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS INTO
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENTS
James S. Freeman t and Rachel D. Godsil*
When community residents learn that their community has been
chosen to host a polluting facility,1 they wonder whether the facility
poses a danger to their health and environment, and why their
community has been chosen. The way government and private cor-
porations have answered these questions in the past has led to
many bitter, protracted struggles between residents, corporations
and their government representatives and officials. It has also re-
sulted in a significant level of citizen distrust.
The rise of the environmental justice movement has focused
awareness on the disparate impact of polluting facilities on poor
communities and communities of color, and the struggles by local
residents to avoid the imposition of polluting facilities and to cope
with the consequences of past sitings.2 In the environmental justice
context, the simple question of "why here?" is extremely weighty,
going well beyond the interests of the facility owner and those who
benefit from the facility's operation to critical issues of community
health, self-determination, basic equity, and governmental
legitimacy.
t National Association for Public Interest Law Equal Justice Fellow, Environ-
mental Justice Project, Brooklyn Legal Services, Corporation A, J.D., 1992, Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School. The Environmental Justice Project is supported by a
grant from the New York Community Trust.
t Associate, Berle, Kass & Case, J.D., 1992, University of Michigan Law School.
The authors wish to thank Mark S. Brownstein, Michael B. Gerrard, Professor James
E. Krier and Foster Maer for their invaluable comments on early drafts of this Article.
1. In this Article, the term "polluting facilities" refers to any publicly or privately
owned facilities that emit some level of pollution that may pose a substantial threat to
the health and safety of the surrounding community. It includes not only obvious
local unwanted land uses ("LULU's") such as nuclear, hazardous, medical, and solid
waste facilities but chemical and petrochemical manufacturing, heavy metals refining
and processing, and many other heavy industry facilities.
2. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, The Regulatory Thickets of Environmental Racism,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993, § 4, at 5. (The use of Mr. Schneider's articles in this Arti-
cle should not be viewed as an endorsement of the arguments presented in them,
which many people in the environmental justice and mainstream environmental
movements believe are misleading and biased toward industry.)
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A critical component of the "why here?" question is the level of
risk posed by a planned facility. The siting process 3 attempts to
address this issue, often through health risk assessments performed
either for the facility as a whole or for the various media (air,
water, bioaccumulation) through which that risk may be trans-
ported to the surrounding community.4 The local residents who
might be affected by a project have their own opinions of the facil-
ity's risk which they have gained through news reports, anecdotal
evidence and their own judgment. They attempt to communicate
their opinions within the siting process, through the press and the
political process. One of the central arguments underlying a con-
tested siting decision is whose perception of risk is more accurate
and legitimate. Statistically calculated environmental risk assess-
ments are, according to conventional wisdom, scientific and precise
determinations of the amount and probability of harm caused by a
present or planned facility. According to this same conventional
wisdom, private citizens' perceptions of risk are indeterminate, and
are constituted from subjective attitudes and feelings.5
Whether scientific risk assessments provide accurate and trust-
worthy conclusions is one issue currently being debated in the sci-
3. The "siting process," for the purposes of this paper, includes the search for a
desirable location by the owner of the projected facility, which may include prelimi-
nary meetings and discussions with local officials and administrative agencies, the ad-
ministrative agency review process, and the political dialogue and decisionmaking
surrounding both proceedings. Under this definition the siting process is a relatively
new and still developing phenomenon. See infra note 15 (discussing the development
of the siting process).
4. Some health risk assessments are performed for public relations purposes by
the corporation seeking to site the facility; in other cases a government agency is
required by law or regulation to perform a health risk assessment. See, e.g., N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 19-0321(4) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994) (requiring a
community health study and analysis of emissions prior to the operation of certain
new solid waste incinerators); Environmental Justice Act of 1993, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., 139 Cong. Rec. S8107 (1993) (requiring health studies of the 100 most polluted
counties nationwide).
5. Keith Schneider, New View Calls Environmental Policy Misguided, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993, at Al ("in the last 15 years environmental policy has too often
evolved largely in reaction to popular panics, not in response to sound scientific anal-
yses") (Part I of a five-part series on environmental policy). But see Daniel Goleman,
Hidden Rules Often Distort Ideas of Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1994, at C1, C10
(stressing the importance of balancing scientific and public perceptions of risk). For a
strong critique of scientific risk assessments, and a discussion of the different percep-
tions of risk held by risk experts and the general public, see Clayton P. Gillette &
James E. Krier, Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1032-33 (1990);
see also Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique
of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992).
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entific and legal communities.6 Whether government and business
have adequately addressed public perceptions of risk through sci-
entific methodologies is another issue. The intensity of local oppo-
sition to polluting facilities strongly suggests that public
perceptions have not been successfully integrated into the official
siting process. During the course of any given siting attempt, opti-
mistic predictions and assurances of safety from corporations and
government agencies contrast with news reports and accounts of
past accidents, failures, and deliberate environmental crimes by
corporations seeking to site polluting facilities.7 The views of local
residents contend against company press releases and government
explanations. The consequences of this clash of perceptions has an
impact not only on the siting process but on the larger issue of
public trust in government and corporate decision-making' Certain
neighborhoods have become notorious among environmental jus-
tice activists and in the media as toxic battlegrounds due to high
concentrations of polluting facilities: Louisiana's "Cancer Alley"8
along the Mississippi River between Baton Rouge and New Orle-
ans; the "toxic doughnut" surrounding Chicago's South Side; South
Central and East Los Angeles; West Harlem, the South Bronx and
Greenpoint-Williamsburg in New York City; and other areas na-
tionwide. 9 Plausible explanations for these conditions have not
been forthcoming from the government agencies and private cor-
porations that manage polluting facilities.
6. See Goleman, supra note 5; Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1062-64; Horn-
stein, supra note 5. There is a large and increasing number of articles on risk analysis,
both within the context of environmental law and as regards public policy in general.
Rather than trying to summarize all of them, the authors of this Article have chosen a
few articles and applied them to the environmental justice context.
7. For reports on corporate crimes, see, for example, CHARLIE CRAY, GREEN-
PEACE REPORT, TRASH INTO CASH: WMI's ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES AND MISDEEDS
(1991); Eric Weltman, Ogden Martin: Trash and Burn, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR,
July/Aug. 1993, at 25-26. For reports of accidents, see, for example, Janice Ellis, CBS
Airs Uranium Plant Controversy During "Eye on America" Segment, GUARDIAN
JOURNAL (Homer, LA), Jan. 28, 1993, at 1 (referring to "lethal accidents that have
plagued" uranium enrichment plants and "the dismal safety records of the govern-
ment's [uranium] enrichment plants").
8. LOUISIANA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
BATTLE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LOUISIANA ... GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY
AND THE PEOPLE (Sept. 1993).
9. See Robert D. Bullard, Introduction, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RA-
CISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS 12 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) [hereinafter
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM].
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The environmental justice movement has seen some successes.' 0
After years of neglect, the federal government and several states
are directing legislative and executive efforts towards reforming
siting processes and remedying discriminatory enforcement of en-
vironmental regulations." Community opposition in general has
proved to be quite powerful in some instances. Since the passage
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in 1976, there has
been only one new siting of a hazardous waste landfill and few new
sitings of hazardous waste incinerators.12 To a lesser extent, munic-
ipal solid waste and medical waste incinerators have also been suc-
cessfully blocked or delayed.13 However, certain factors behind
these successes suggest that procedural reforms of the siting pro-
cess, though sorely needed, may not provide a complete solution to
disparate dumping unless they also address the conflict over the
nature of risk and how it is measured.'
4
This Article discusses the issues of perception of risk and citizen
involvement in environmentally sensitive siting decisions. Part I
describes the different phases of the siting process, i.e., the various
determinations made at certain points during the process, the fac-
tors that enter into these calculations, and the interests implicated
in each. Part II discusses the gap between citizens' and govern-
ment agencies' understanding of environmental problems: what
constitutes an acceptable risk, how risk is measured, and who
makes these decisions. Part III sets out ways in which community
groups can more effectively incorporate their concerns into the sit-
10. See infra note 50 (discussing successful opposition to a hazardous waste
incinerator).
11. See Schneider, supra note 2; Marianne Lavelle, Clinton Pushes on Race and
Environment, NAT'L. L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 1. For legislative reforms see, for example,
Christopher Johnson, Incineration Woes, Z MAGAZINE, Oct. 1993, for a description of
the Pollution Prevention and Incineration Alternatives Act of 1993, Environmental
Justice Act of 1993, H.R. 2015, The Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993, H.R.
1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); The Hazardous Waste Community Information
Statement Act, S. REP. No. 533, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
12. Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radio-
active Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL.
L. REV. 1047, 1052 (1994); see also Michael B. Gerrard, Whose Backyard, Whose
Risk: Fear, Fairness and Efficiency in Toxic and Nuclear Waste Siting (forthcoming
1994). The hazardous waste incinerator located in East Liverpool, Ohio, is a signifi-
cant exception. See Keith Schneider, Clinton Will Not Fight Toxic-Waste Incinerator,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1993, at A20.
13. See Gerrard, supra note 12, at 1073-76; Bruce Frankel, Raising a Stink Over
Incinerator, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 1992, at 6A.
14. See infra part II.C.
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ing process and argues that public officials should give greater
weight to public perceptions of risk.
I. The Siting Process
During the past century the siting process has evolved beyond a
relatively simple procedure involving primarily the owner of the
prospective facility and local government officials.15 With the ad-
vent of zoning and land use, environmental review, and freedom of
information and public disclosure laws, 16 the siting process has be-
come a complex decisionmaking mechanism involving a broad
range of interests and issues at the federal, state and local levels.
A. The Initial Search
The siting process commences when a corporation or govern-
mental body begins a search for a proper location for a new facility.
The "proper location" is determined by a number of considerations
deemed relevant by the facility's sponsors. These considerations
generally relate to the physical requirements of the facility itself
and to the costs of siting, constructing and operating the facility.' 7
The facility's physical requirements include a sufficiently sized
plot of land suitable for building, proximity to roads, water or other
transportation networks, proximity to the raw materials or wastes
handled by the facility, proper zoning or compatibility with neigh-
boring land uses, and availability of labor resources. These factors
also clearly affect the costs of construction and operation, and by
finding the site which best meets these considerations, a facility's
proponents can minimize these costs. The siting process itself en-
15. Comprehensive zoning of land uses is a development of the early 20th Cen-
tury: New York City established a zoning ordinance in 1916, and a local zoning ordi-
nance was first upheld in Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926). See generally
JOHN DELAFONS, LAND USE CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1969). The
environmental movement of the 1960's and 1970's brought a wave of environmental
statutes that added new dimensions to the siting process; most importantly the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988 & Supp. 1992)
("NEPA"), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. 1992), the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988 & Supp. 1992), and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3473 (1988) ("RCRA").
16. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988), and state public dis-
closure laws (for example, N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 1988)), have affected
the siting process by giving citizens' groups access to a wide range of information
concerning governmental decisions, contracts, costs, and corporate financing and
structure that would otherwise remain closed to the public.
17. This description assumes that corporations and governmental entities are eco-
nomically rational actors who will look for a physically suitable site that is also the
least expensive in both short and long term costs.
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tails substantial expenditures of time and money through such ac-
tivities as negotiating with local officials, obtaining permits, and
gaining political approval for the project; all of which are necessary
preconditions for building the facility. 18 A community that resists
an attempt to site a facility may raise these costs by filing lawsuits,
pushing for more exhaustive administrative review, and delaying or
blocking local political approval.' 9 Therefore, to the extent that a
facility's backers can find a community that approves of the facility
or cannot effectively resist it, they can minimize siting costs.
20
One of the central allegations of the environmental justice move-
ment is that corporations have targeted communities who are least
able to resist the siting of polluting facilities. The growing body of
evidence compiled through studies performed by the government,
academics and civil rights organizations shows that poor communi-
ties and communities of color are disproportionately burdened by
environmental hazards,2' and that race is often a stronger indicator
of environmental degradation than income level.22 Internal corpo-
18. Louis BLUMBERG & ROBERT GOTrLIEB, WAR ON WASTE: CAN AMERICA
WIN ITS BATTLE WITH GARBAGE? 147-48 (1989).
19. In Homer, Louisiana, for example, local opposition to a proposed uranium
enrichment plant has helped raise costs by $3.5 million and helped delay the granting
of licenses. See Joe Fisher, Uranium Plant Cost Hits $31.7M, SHREVEPORT TIMES,
June 9, 1993, at 1.
20. BLUMBERG & GOTTLIEB, supra note 18, at 58-60.
21. See COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 15-16 (1987); MICHAEL GREENBERG &
RICHARD ANDERSON, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES: THE CREDIBILITY GAP 158
(1984); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILL
AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING
COMMUNITIES (1983); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing Environmental Justice: The Distri-
butional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787 (1992); Paul
Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Fac-
tors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 925-27
(1982).
22. See supra note 21. But see Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It?
Environmental Equity and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 6 CORNELL L.
REV. 1001 (1993) (arguing that the studies have not shown to what extent this dispar-
ity has been caused by discrimination at the time of siting as opposed to market forces
after the fact). Regardless of the cause, though, communities do feel that they have
been dumped on because of race or economic class, and these perceptions cannot be
assuaged or dealt with fairly by simply pointing to market forces. For a survey of
African-American residents of five communities with hazardous facilities, see ROB-
ERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
86-90 (1990) (reporting that 55% of respondents believed their community had been
singled out; of these 55%, 63% believed it was on the basis of race, and 19% believed
it was on the basis of poverty or political powerlessness). For accusations of racism in
specific siting decisions, see, for example, Jim Clarke, Citizens Group, LES Lock
Horns Over Private Enrichment Proposal, THE ENERGY DAILY, June 19, 1992, at 1
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rate memos and at least one government study have suggested that
communities with certain demographic populations are more at-
tractive locations for polluting facilities because they lack the edu-
cation or political clout needed to oppose effectively an unwanted
land use.2 3 There is a clear conflict between the backers of a pol-
luting facility and the members of the community which has been
chosen to host it. The host community will bear the brunt of costs
in terms of health risks, lower property values and impacts on aes-
thetic qualities, while the benefits of the facility (for instance, the
disposal of hazardous waste) will be accrued within a much larger
area, perhaps nationwide.24 Hence, certain communities are being
sacrificed for a supposed wider public good.2" When local residents
suspect that factors beyond simple physical requirements and envi-
ronmental compatibility have influenced the decision to place a
polluting facility in their neighborhood, this conflict of interest is
heightened. Perceptions of environmental racism or dumping on
the poor lead to anger and psychological stress within the commu-
nity.26 Several commentators argue that corporations have deliber-
ately or unconsciously concluded that race, average income,
average education and other socio-economic characteristics can
and should be considered in selecting a suitable site.27 Environ-
mental justice activists argue that these characteristics should not
be relevant.28
("[Flolks in the black community are definitely outraged. They definitely think their
community was picked as the point of least resistance."); Frankel, supra note 13
(South Bronx residents felt that a decision to site a medical waste incinerator in a
heavily industrialized poor minority neighborhood "is a classic form of environmental
racism.").
23. See Been, supra note 22, at 1002-03. For governmental studies, see BLUMBERG
& GOTTLIEB, supra note 18, at 59.
24. See Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV.
394 n.17 (1991).
25. See Bullard, Introduction, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra
note 9, at 12 (discussing how certain communities of color have been turned into
"human sacrifice zones"); see also Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Envi-
ronmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q.
619, 628-30 (1992) (analyzing reasons for inequity in the siting of polluting facilities).
26. See R. George Wright, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the Problems of Stig-
matic and Racial Injury, 23 ARIz. ST. L.J. 777, 787 (1991).
27. See Cole, supra note 25, at 628-30; Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environ-
mental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRON-
MENTAL RACISM, supra note 9, at 17-19.
28. See Rev. Benjamin Chavis, Jr., Foreword, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM, supra note 9, at 3-5. WMI and other corporations that manage polluting
facilities strongly deny any suggestion of overt discriminatory intent in their siting
decisions. See John J. Fried, Pollution as Racial Insult, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
June 27, 1993, at C1, C7 (quoting industry officials as saying that siting decisions were
19941
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B. The Administrative Review Process
The administrative review process at first appears to offer a neu-
tral check on internal corporate or governmental decisionmaking.
Administrative agencies are charged with impartially regulating in
the public interest, have expertise in the area at issue,29 and are
ostensibly removed from political pressure.3 ° Polluting facilities
typically require one or more permits and, in some cases, an envi-
ronmental impact statement ("EIS") from regulatory agencies. An
EIS is supposed to facilitate environmentally sensitive decision
making by agencies by requiring a review of a project's environ-
mental impacts, the local environment, and the options for control-
ling or limiting those impacts. Environmental controls are then
imposed on the project through permits.
The concept of environmental review and the format of the EIS
stems from the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 31
which was passed in 1969 as a response to growing environmental
concerns. The statutory purpose of NEPA is:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and wel-
fare of man .... 32
Further putative goals of NEPA are to:
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aes-
thetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesir-
able and unintended consequences;
(4) ... maintain, wherever possible, an environment which sup-
33ports diversity and variety of individual choice ....
Section 4332 of NEPA and the regulations implementing it devel-
oped the EIS as the means to carry out these purposes in all major
"color-blind" and that charges of environmental racism were "unfair"); Keith Schnei-
der, Blacks Fighting Blacks on Plan for Dump Site, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at A12
(stating that companies proposing to site hazardous waste dumps in poor, rural,
predominantly African-American Noxubee County, Mississippi said there were scien-
tific reasons for the county's selection).
29. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1061.
30. Id. n.92.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
32. Id. (1993).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4331.
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federal actions having a significant impact on the environment.34
During the preparation of an EIS, a government agency must con-
sider a wide variety of technical characteristics in determining the
potential environmental impacts of the proposed project.35 NEPA
also mandates consideration of adverse impacts on aesthetic and
cultural values such as impacts on urban quality, historic properties
or on public activities such as fishing or hiking.36 NEPA further
requires opportunities for public notice and comment on the EIS
before it becomes final.37 Many states have passed "little NEPA"
statutes resulting in similar requirements for state projects.38
Further environmental review is imposed by permit require-
ments under federal laws such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean
Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"), 9 and state analogues of these statutes.4 ° Such permits
are designed to prevent facilities from discharging pollutants at
levels that are harmful to the public health.41 Federal laws have
given administrative agencies strong statutory mandates, and enor-
mous amounts of administrative resources go into the preparation
of each EIS or permit; thus, the administrative review process
should act as a powerful curb against overly risky facilities and
their disparate siting. Yet, this ideal is tarnished by a number of
factors.
First, agencies are not immune to political influence, particularly
in favor of the industries that they are set up to regulate.42 Capture
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1993); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1993).
35. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16. A typical EIS runs into the hundreds of pages; the state
EIS for the Brooklyn Navy Yard Incinerator is over 1,000 pages with appendices. See
DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION, CITY OF NEW YORK, FINAL ENVIRONMENT IMPACT
STATEMENT ON THE PROPOSED BROOKLYN NAVY YARD RESOURCE RECOVERY FA-
CILITY (1985).
36. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b).
37. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19; id. § 1503.4(b).
38. See, e.g., New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp 1994).
39. RCRA authorizes states to establish siting procedures for solid waste facilities.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-47 (1988). State programs must include provisions governing "per-
mitting, compliance evaluation, enforcement, public participation, and sharing of in-
formation." 40 C.F.R. § 271.1(c) (1990).
40. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSER. LAW § 17-0101 (McKinney 1993) (outlining
New York's state analogue to the Federal Clean Water Act); see also Godsil, supra
note 24, at 402-08 (describing state siting processes under the mandate of RCRA).
41. For example, the purpose of the Federal Clean Air Act is "to protect and
enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health
and welfare . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1993).
42. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1064-70.
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theory, as summarized by Professors Gillette and Krier,43 argues
that regulated industries will be able to organize and communicate
their views to agencies more effectively than the many widespread
numbers of citizens potentially affected by an agency action, thus
biasing regulation in the industries' favor.44 Regulated industries
will also be able to expend more resources in providing data to
agencies on environmental impacts, in part simply because indus-
tries possess much of the information about their own processes.4 5
Aside from problems of institutional bias, the environmental re-
view process itself is open to criticism.
Regarding NEPA and environmental review procedures, since
the Vermont Yankee and Stryker's Bay decisions, NEPA has im-
posed only procedural duties on agencies rather than substantive
ones. In other words, NEPA requires that environmental consider-
ations be taken into account in government decisionmaking, but
not that such considerations compel a particular decision.4 6 A re-
lated but more severe criticism is that the EIS process has evolved
to actually discourage pro-environmental review of agencies'
decisions:
Indeed, the legal and institutional machinery that insures some
look, inadvertently - and most unfortunately - precludes the
hard look that could and should influence agency decisions. To
put the case very baldly: Agencies cannot be penetrating or cre-
ative when their analyses are directed and mobilized for primar-
ily defensive purposes. 47
The EIS process has often been used to justify an agency's deci-
sion and protect it from judicial scrutiny rather than to undertake a
full and proper review of a project's environmental consequences.
While some state NEPA analogues do have some substantive im-
pact on agency decisionmaking,48 the EIS process itself may still be
applied defensively, i.e., to justify agency decisions after the fact
43. Id. at 1065-68.
44. This argument applies in even greater force when a local government is the
proponent of a facility or a class of facilities, and the lines of regulatory communica-
tion are from one governmental entity to another.
45. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, nn.110, 111.
46. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978);
Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
47. Bardach & Pugliaresi, The Environmental Impact Statement vs. The Real
World, 49 PuB. INTEREST 22, 24 (1977).
48. See, e.g., Jackson v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 67 N.Y.2d
400, 414 (1986) (SEQRA [the New York equivalent of NEPA] "imposes far more
'action-forcing' or 'substantive' requirements on state and local decisionmakers than
NEPA imposes on their federal counterparts" (citation omitted)).
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rather than to fulfill the statutory purpose. Moreover, any EIS or
permit proceeding by necessity and design focuses on a single pro-
ject or a specific portion of one; it does not consider cumulative
impacts from existing as well as projected sources of pollution.
Until recently agencies have not considered patterns of multiple
siting decisions over time in a single community.49
Finally, although the EIS and permit processes normally include
opportunities for public hearings and public comment on proposed
projects, the proceedings remain technocratic. The average citizen
is overwhelmed with hundreds of pages of documents written in
jargon that is often hard to understand, even for those with some
technical training.50 Conversely, both the corporate or governmen-
tal sponsors of a facility and the agency officials in charge of ad-
ministrative review are trained in the technical aspects of
environmental review. A common background and language tends
to foster greater sympathy between these two groups, at the ex-
pense of public participants who are viewed as "ignorant" or
"untrained."5 1
This critique raises questions as to whether NEPA and similar
state environmental review laws have lived up to the promise im-
plicit in their stated purposes of protecting public health and the
environment. It also points out the limitations of the traditional
siting process. Federal, state and local legislatures have advanced
reforms in siting procedures that are aimed at remedying discrimi-
49. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 340, 410 n.20 (1976) (an agency need not
"consider the possible environmental impacts of [actions not proposed by the agency]
when preparing the impact statement on proposed actions"). Some courts have read
the Supreme Court's language so broadly that they do not require an agency to con-
sider in an Environmental Assessment the cumulative environmental effects of ac-
tions over which the agency has no power. See Ringsred v. City of Duluth, 828 F.2d
1305, 1308-09 (8th Cir. 1987). But see NEw YORK, N.Y., CHARTER §§ 203-4 (1990)
("fair share criteria" that requires the consideration of cumulative impacts upon a
host community).
50. See supra text accompanying note 32 (discussing the average length of an EIS).
One recent environmental justice case concerning a hazardous waste incinerator cen-
tered on an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) that was over 1,000 pages long and
available only in English, although almost 40% of the local residents were monol-
ingual in Spanish. A California state court overturned the County's approval of the
facility in part because of its exclusion of Spanish-speakers from the public comment
process. El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991). Chemical Waste Management, the fa-
cility's sponsor, later withdrew its application to construct the incinerator in Ket-
tleman Hills citing "changing market conditions and the company's evolving business
objectives." Hazardous Waste: Company Withdraws Application To Build Incinerator,
24 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 881 (Sept. 17, 1993).
51. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1086.
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natory siting. 2 The Federal EPA is also addressing environmental
justice issues through its newly created National Environmental
Justice Advisory Council, and through EPA administrator Carol
Browner's pledge to focus on environmental justice issues.53 At
present, however, the gap between the purpose and practice of
NEPA and the failure of environmental agencies to regulate fairly
so as to protect public health and the environment has created a
dissonance between the law stated and its operation in the real
world. This dissonance has only been intensified when the environ-
mental review process confounds or fails to respond adequately to
a community's perceptions and fears.
C. The Political Process
The political process has been the arena for most of the successes
of environmental justice activists in recent years. In some in-
stances, communities engaging in mass political organizing and
demonstrating have caused corporations to look elsewhere for host
communities or local governments to reverse decisions to build fa-
cilities. 4 There are several reasons for the relative efficacy of
political strategies. The political process purports to allow citizens
to express their views to decisionmakers who are responsive to
public sentiment and are able to communicate with the public on
its own terms. Politics offers local community groups opportunities
to build support for their position through collective action and or-
ganizing-building "people power. ' 55 This is a sharp contrast to
the autocracy of corporate decisionmaking or the technocracy of
the administrative process. These successes should not, however,
compel the conclusion that the political process is unbiased or that
the siting process is not in need of reform.
The political process is not a separate procedure from the facility
owner's search for sites and the administrative review process;
political considerations intrude on every aspect of the siting pro-
52. See Johnson, supra note 11; NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER §§ 203-4 (1990) (the
"fair share criteria").
53. See Lavelle, supra note 11 (discussing the Council's investigation of whether
the EPA violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating against
minority neighborhoods in Louisiana and Mississippi in its permitting and enforce-
ment programs).
54. See supra notes 12-13, 19-20 and accompanying text.
55. See Cole, supra note 25 (discussing why environmental justice issues are fun-
damentally political problems, and the advantages to working within the political pro-
cess rather than in the courts or administrative proceedings).
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cess. 56 The opposition or support of local or federal politicians
may influence an owner's selection of a particular site, through
public relations and media efforts, tax breaks, relationships with a
particular industry, or other incentives.5 7 Politics may also intrude
upon administrative procedures through the decisions of political
appointees who head agencies, policy decisions by lawmakers that
affect an agency's scope of authority or funding, or simply through
traditional lines of communication between different branches of
government. 8 These influences operate most directly within the
political process itself.
Polluting facilities are either owned and operated by a private
corporation or are owned publicly, although even in the latter case
they are probably built and/or operated by private corporations. In
either case, the political deck is stacked against the community or
neighborhood slated to host the facility. Through perfectly legal
means, such as campaign contributions, employment opportunities,
lobbying and information campaigns, 59 as well as through illegal
means, corporations have the ability to influence local elected of-
ficials in the same way they influence the administrative process.
For instance, in the fight over the Brooklyn Navy Yard Incinerator,
former Deputy Mayor Norman Steisel's ties to the incinerator in-
dustry as a former lobbyist and financial underwriter made his pro-
incinerator stance suspect in the eyes of environmental activists.6'
Corporations are established to take coordinated action. By
contrast, local citizens trying to oppose a project face greater diffi-
culties in organizing and communicating their concerns than the
56. See generally, Michel Gelobter, Defining Urban Environmental Justice, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 841 (1994).
57. In the Homer, Louisiana uranium enrichment plant controversy, U.S. Senator
Bennett Johnston played an active role on behalf of the plant's proponents, particu-
larly as Chair of the Senate Energy Committee. See Clarke, supra note 22; Ellis,
supra note 7; Peter Shinkle, Ex-Johnston Aide Involved in Push for New Plant,
SHREVEPORT ST. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1990, at 1.
58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. For the impact of political decisions
on the administrative process, see, for example, Keith Schneider, Clinton Will Not
Fight Toxic-Waste Incinerator, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1993, at A20 (discussing the Clin-
ton administration's decision to allow a hazardous waste incinerator in East Liver-
pool, Ohio to begin operation, despite an earlier promise -by the Vice President to
block it and speculating that the Clintons, White House Chief of Staff Thomas Mc-
Larty, and EPA Administrator Carol Browner may have had conflicts of interest vis-
a-vis the incinerator and its financial backers).
59. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1066.
60. See Weltman, supra note 7 (discussing instances of bribery or other illegal
influence).
61. Matthew Reiss, Norman Steisel and the Art of the Done Deal: Garbage Broker,
VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 26, 1991, at 30, 32.
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private corporations and government agencies who are backing the
project.62 To be effective, citizens from different classes, back-
grounds and professions must come together to discuss the issues,
agree on a common strategy, and take time out from their regular
activities to implement a strategy to counter the small group of ex-
perts whose full time job is to get the facility sited and built. The
difficulties inherent in this public organization are particularly
acute if the community is politically disenfranchised, fragmented,
or has only minimal representation at the decisionmaking level.63
Similarly, the economic benefits from building a new corporate
facility to its financial backers are readily monetized. The facility's
ostensible benefits to society, whether in producing goods or dis-
posing of wastes, begin to accrue as soon as it begins operation. In
contrast, the potential negative health impacts of a polluting facil-
ity are latent, i.e., they are not likely to appear for several decades.
Such impacts are spread out among the residents of the surround-
ing community and are by their very nature probabalistic; precise
estimates are practically impossible.' 4 Gillette and Krier point out
that risk managers, including politicians, will tend to choose
courses that produce immediate, measurable benefits over those
that prevent a potential harm at some point in the future, because
such benefits are more easily communicable to superiors (or to vot-
ers) and offer more tangible proof of accomplishment. 65 Corpora-
tions will often cite the local economic benefits produced by a
facility in terms of jobs and tax revenues when lobbying for polit-
ical approval.66
62. Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1065-68. Gillette & Krier focus their analysis
on risks that are dispersed throughout a wide area or nationally. However, their con-
clusion that corporations are more able than the general public to organize and com-
municate their views also applies to risks that are imposed on relatively
homogeneous, small town populations.
63. Communities targeted for environmentally hazardous facilities are dispropor-
tionately poor and/or communities of color, and face considerable obstacles to effec-
tive political action. See Godsil, supra note 24, at 400. Communities may also be
fragmented by class or ethnic divisions. See Rachel D. Godsil & James S. Freeman,
Jobs, Trees and Autonomy: The Convergence of Environmental Justice and Commu-
nity Economic Development, MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL STUD. - (forthcoming 1994).
Finally, a community may be well organized and represented, but if it elects only one
or two representatives to the city or state body responsible for a siting decision, its
ability to influence the political process may still be small.
64. Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1039-40; see also Hornstein, supra note 5, at
569-75. For a discussion of the limits to "scientific" statistical risk assessments, see
Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1062-64.
65. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1040-41.
66. See Ellis, supra note 7 (quoting the president of a proposed facility as saying,
"we think we're the best thing that's going to happen in that community for many
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If the project is publicly sponsored, by the time a community
learns it has been targeted, its elected and administrative officials
have already made at least a preliminary decision that the facility is
necessary and that their community is a likely location for it. The
community must then persuade their representatives to deviate
from an ordained course of action, often after a considerable
amount of time and effort has already been expended in the plan-
ning process. Publicly owned polluting facilities, such as incinera-
tors or sewage treatment plants, are capital intensive projects that
require massive financial backing, typically through state or munic-
ipal bonds.6 7 The financial institutions underwriting the bonds for
the facility and the law firms negotiating the transaction therefore
stand to gain large fees from the project's approval and, for the
sake of their own profits, may campaign for a facility through the
political process by the methods used by corporate proponents of a
facility.68
This outline of the disparity in political power assumes that the
targeted community is relatively cohesive and politically organized
and has sufficient resources to make its concerns known in the
political process. Many communities targeted for polluting facili-
ties, however, are poor and/or communities of color. In these com-
years," referring to the plant's potential impact on the depressed local economy);
Schneider, supra note 28 (stating that supporters of a hazardous waste landfill were
attracted by offers of jobs and contracts to minority businesses). For evidence that
such benefits tend to be exaggerated or illusory, see Gerrard, supra note 12, at 1099-
1100 (stating that off site waste disposal facilities generally create little in terms of
jobs or tax revenues); Schneider, supra note 2 (According to Pat Bryant, executive
director of the Gulf Coast Tenants Organization, "[wie bear a disproportionate cost in
terms of health from plants in our communities, and for the most part we are not
included in the jobs that are available.").
67. The Brooklyn Navy Yard incinerator is officially estimated to cost $450 mil-
lion. See Dennis Hevesi, State Approves the Brooklyn Navy Yard Incinerator, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993, at A47 (reporting that NYPIRG has estimated the total costs of
construction and operation over the life of the facility at over $1 billion); Interview
with Arthur Kell, New York Public Interest Research Group (Nov. 22, 1993). The
cost of the Homer uranium enrichment plant is estimated at $800 million. See Fried,
supra note 28, at C7.
68. Former Deputy Mayor Steisel's ties to the New York bond industry, through
past employment and campaign contributions, were also a sore point for anti-inciner-
ation activists. See Reiss, supra note 61; see also Jeff Bailey, Up in Smoke: Fading
Garbage Crisis Leaves Incinerators Competing for Trash, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1993,
at Al (discussing how engineering consultants, investment bankers and bond lawyers
"profited handsomely from fees connected to bond underwritings to finance
incinerators").
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munities, the effects of racism, coupled with the lack of money,
time and political power, further exacerbate the disparity.69
The foregoing description of the siting process outlines the con-
flicts and the disparities in access and resources that can result in
siting decisions which are biased against targeted communities;
even where the community ultimately succeeds in opposing a facil-
ity, the current process forces it to expend considerable resources
fighting an unwanted, and sometimes unnecessary, facility.70 These
conflicts also result in a dispute over the perceived level of risk
posed by polluting facilities, and how risk is measured within the
decisionmaking process. The next part of this Article argues that
the conflict over perception is similarly biased against local
communities.
II. Perceptions of Risk
Each conflict over the siting of a polluting facility generates op-
posing conceptions of its risk which are debated during the siting
process. The ability to provide information on risk and to portray
that information as accurate and dependable is crucial to influenc-
ing the process. Where disagreement over the siting itself produces
a conflict of intent, disagreement over the level of risk produces a
conflict of perception. The siting conflicts outlined in Section I are
distinct from the risk perception debate.
Just as environmental justice issues cross the boundaries of tradi-
tional environmental concerns to encompass questions of democ-
racy and local autonomy, the battle over risk perception is part of a
larger, ongoing debate over corporate and governmental accounta-
bility and over the methods used to assess public risk. Therefore,
events outside the environmental justice context have an impact on
the public's perception of environmental risk and the trustworthi-
ness of corporate and governmental decisions regarding such risks.
Many people do not trust corporate or governmental decisions
concerning the risks of polluting facilities for reasons that go well
beyond the specific issues involved in a given siting dispute.
Certain historical events such as the Vietnam War and the
Watergate cover-up, the Iran-Contra scandal, and the savings and
loan debacle are examples of government deception that have
eroded the public's confidence in governmental veracity. Closer to
69. See Godsil & Freeman, supra note 63 (discussing the difficulties faced by the
poor and communities of color in organizing to act upon environmental issues).
70. See Bailey, supra note 68 (reporting how many solid waste incinerators be-
came bad investments as costs rose and the waste stream declined in the late 1980s).
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the environmental justice context, Three Mile Island, the extent of
pollution at the Department of Energy's bomb-making facility at
Rocky Flats, Colorado,71 and the recent controversy over govern-
ment tests of radioactive substances 72 are instances where govern-
ment reluctance to admit the severity of public risks increased
public resistance to the technology-in this case, nuclear weapons
and power plants-responsible for those risks. As former Secre-
tary of the Interior Stewart Udall stated: "The Government's paid
a huge price for that approach. It's caused the public distrust that
runs so deep now."'73
Other historical incidents have demonstrated corporate tenden-
cies to downplay or cover up the extent of public risk in order to
avoid liability. The Ford Pinto recall,74 the asbestos litigation
against Johns-Manville, the Dalkon Shield controversy and other
product liability lawsuits have either demonstrated evidence or al-
leged that some corporations have willfully withheld information
on the risk posed by their products, despite clear evidence of ad-
verse impacts on consumers. Accidents and violations of environ-
mental laws occurring at polluting facilities are becoming
increasingly well known,75 and directly relate to the environmental
71. See Gerrard, supra note 12, at 1162.
72. See Keith Schneider, Redressing the Harms of the Nuclear Age May Not Be
Cheap, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1994, at E2.
73. Id. at E3.
74. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (Ct. of App. 1981).
75. SAN DIEGO DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, FINAL REPORT: WASTE MANAGE-
MENT, INC. (Mar. 1992); see also Weltman, supra note 7 and Ellis, supra note 7 for
other reports on corporate malfeasance. The San Diego District Attorney's report has
become well known within environmental justice circles. It concludes:
Waste Management, Inc.'s, methods of doing business and history of civil
and criminal violations has established a predictable pattern which has been
fairly consistent over a significant number of years. The history of the com-
pany presents of a combination of environmental and anti-trust violations
and public corruption cases which must be viewed with considerable con-
cern. Waste Management has been capable of absorbing enormous fines and
other sanctions levied against it while still maintaining a high earnings ratio.
We do not know whether these sanctions has had any punitive effect on the
company or have merely been considered as additional operating expenses.
We have reviewed recent practices and problems and our concerns have
not diminished. The company's recent business practices and violations do
not appear to be different from the past. We have been unable to determine
whether Waste Management's history, as reflected by this report, has ben
due to a failure of proper management, or hasbeen the result of deliberate
corporate policy. Whatever the case, the company's history requires ex-
treme caution by the San Diego County Board of Supervisors or any other
governmental entity contemplating any contractual or business relationship
with Waste Management.
SAN DIEGO DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, supra, at 57.
1994]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
justice movement's attack on the motives and values of polluting
industries. These events do not take place in a vacuum, but con-
tribute to the public's general sense of the truth of government or
corporate statements before a specific siting controversy ever be-
gins. Within the siting process itself, additional factors add to the
conflict over risk perception.
A. The Preliminary Debate Over Risk
When a corporation or governmental entity has selected a spe-
cific site for a polluting project, it will often begin a public informa-
tion campaign to persuade the local community to agree to the
siting. In Homer, Louisiana, for example, sponsors of a proposed
uranium enrichment plant distributed a videotape on the facility to
residents and even paid for a delegation of local citizens to tour
enrichment plants in Europe. In predominantly African-American
Noxubee County, Mississippi, Hughes-Federated hired an officer in
the local N.A.A.C.P. as a consultant to support its proposed toxic
waste dump.76 The key goal of these campaigns is to persuade peo-
ple that the facility does not threaten the community's health and
safety. Unpersuaded community members are usually accused of
being "ignorant" or "superstitious."' 77 Given the heightened con-
cern over discriminatory siting, company officials are quick to deny
that race or class was a factor in a siting decision. 78 However, the
histories of similar facilities may lead to genuine fears over public
health. In addition, a town's demographics may support a percep-
tion of racism. When this occurs, attempts to deny or dismiss the
fears and perceptions of local residents as ignorant or mistaken
leads to increased mistrust of a facility's sponsors and resistance to
the siting.
76. For a description of the Homer, Louisiana controversy, see Ellis, supra note 7.
For Noxubee County, see Schneider, supra note 28. See also BLUMBERG & GOT-
TLIEB, supra note 18, at 58-60, for a brief overview of how and why public relations
campaigns became an integral part of the siting process.
77. In the Homer uranium plant controversy, a local bank president and supporter
of the plant said, "Many of those who are opposed (to the plant) do not have their
foundation in fact. They have it in superstition and unfounded fears in my opinion."
Ellis, supra note 7; see also Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, n.138.
78. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 28 (stating that sponsors of the dump noted the
geology of the county as a reason for siting the dump in Noxubee County, although
that geology was virtually identical in 13 other Mississippi counties, and Noxubee had
the highest percentage of black residents); see also Godsil & Freeman, supra note 63.
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B. Measuring Risk in the Administrative Review Process
At the start of any administrative review, the proponents of a
facility already have an advantage over the local community in ac-
cess to the government agency. Corporate, local government and
administrative agency professionals share a common background
of education and training in environmental, public health and sta-
tistical risk assessment disciplines. They are familiar with each
others' terms and methodologies, and are likely to cross over be-
tween corporate, government and agency employers during the
course of their careers.79 Although the local residents fighting a
project lack the training and the professional background of their
opponents or the overseers of the administrative process, they may
develop considerable expertise during a siting controversy. Local
residents, however, are more likely to be perceived as untrained
outsiders than corporate professionals, regardless of their
knowledge.
This disparity in backgrounds also leads to a disagreement over a
crucial but often neglected question: "what does 'risk' mean? 80
As described by Gillette and Krier, public risk perceptions include
factors not captured in the statistical measurement of risk, which is
measured as expected mortality, or anticipated deaths resulting
from the risk over a specific period of time.81 Lay persons, how-
ever, are concerned not only with the raw probability of a risk, but
with its nature and origin: whether a risk results from voluntary or
involuntary exposure; is difficult to quantify or has a long latency
period before adverse effects appear; has irreversible consequences
or catastrophic potential; or is manmade or naturally caused. 82 Gil-
lette and Krier point out that these factors implicate deeper public
concerns about autonomy and equality. For instance, voluntariness
concerns individual freedom of choice: people generally are more
amenable to risks they choose to take rather than risks imposed by
79. BLUMBERG & GOTrLIEB, supra note 18, at 72 (discussing the "revolving door
that developed between public agencies and the waste-to-energy industry"); see also
supra note 58 (discussing common background of experts).
80. Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1071; Goleman, supra note 5.
81. Gillette & Krier state that experts tend to see risk in terms of expected annual
fatalities, whereas public perceptions of risk are "n-dimensional," that is, they take
into account many other factors besides the single factor of probability of deaths.
Moreover, experts view statistically equal chances of death as identical-i.e., 1,000
expected deaths in a single accident each year are the same as 1,000 expected deaths
spread out over the year, or 10,000 expected deaths once every ten years-whereas
the public sees vital differences between these cases. Gillette & Krier, supra note 5,
at 1071-74; see also Hornstein, supra note 5, at 597.
82. Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1071-73.
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outside actors. 83 The factors of scientific uncertainty and latency
inhibit informed choice, which is a necessary component of rational
decisionmaking. In addition, these factors impede the identifica-
tion and implementation of preventive and remedial measures for
risk exposure. 84 Michel Gerrard adopts a similar taxonomy of pub-
lic attitudes towards risk in his discussion of dread, intrusion and
trust.8 5 He defines dread as a general cultural attitude towards cer-
tain substances or events as inherently risky, and points to hazard-
ous and radioactive wastes as prime examples of substances that
induce public dread. 6 Intrusion is the lack of control over the im-
position of a risk and the outside or foreign nature of that riskaT-a
quality very close to Gillette and Krier's focus on voluntariness and
autonomy. Finally, Gerrard points out that public perceptions of
risk and consequent opposition to risk is partly a function of the
level of public trust in the institution(s) responsible for creating
and/or locating that risk.88
Such differences in perceptions and measurements of risk cause
disagreement between experts and lay persons over what consti-
tutes an acceptable risk. If the corporate and government experts
support statistical risk assessments and reflexively dismiss public
perceptions as flawed or uninformed,8 9 a biased and incompletely
informed decision will result. Further, conclusions based on meth-
odologies with which residents are unfamiliar or fundamentally dis-
agree will fail to gain public trust. Gillette and Krier conclude:
The problem comes down to competing rationalities. Admit
this, and it unarguably follows that the choice of approach [to
risk assessment] is an ethical and political one that technical ex-
perts have neither the knowledge nor the authority to dictate,
because the issue transcends technocratic expertise. 90
83. Id. at 1076-77; Goleman, supra note 5.
84. Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1076-77.
85. Gerrard, supra note 12, at 1155-63.
86. Id. at 209-12; Hornstein, supra note 5, at 615.
87. Gerrard, supra note 12, at 1158-61.
88. Id. at 1164-65.
89. For a discussion of the reasons why experts might be so attached to statistical
risk assessment, see Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1084-85.
90. Id. at 1085. Hornstein similarly concludes: "Comparative risk analysis gives an
undeserved assurance of scientific legitimacy to the inescapably collective (and polit-
ical) process of establishing social policies and priorities on environmental problems."
Hornstein, supra note 5, at 630.
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C. Public Perceptions of Risk in the Political Process
As discussed in Part I, the political process is probably the most
favorable forum for community residents to voice their concerns
regarding a proposed facility. Success in the political arena, how-
ever, is not an endorsement of the present siting process. If the
intense opposition to polluting facilities inspires large-scale polit-
ical organizing and activity, 91 it strongly suggests that many of the
technocratic administrative siting processes do not adequately deal
with controversial issues in siting. Although successful oppositions
demonstrate that public risk perceptions can have a political im-
pact on the siting process, local communities should not have to
endure a hostile siting process and laborious organizing efforts to
have their concerns addressed. Gerrard suggests that community
opposition is at its strongest and most effective when the opposed
facility has high factors of dread and intrusion, as is the case with
hazardous waste incinerators or nuclear waste storage sites.92 This
may explain why proponents of technocratic environmental law ar-
gue that environmental risk issues should not be determined by the
public's "subjective fears and aversions. ' 93
Successful community oppositions do not guarantee that all com-
munities will be effective in incorporating their concerns over risk
and preventing disparate siting. Without the influence to push its
agenda, a community's opinion will not gain favor in the political
process. Elected officials may prefer the artificial exactitude of a
91. See, e.g., CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 9, at 3 (citing
the fact that at a demonstration protesting a PCB waste landfill siting in predomi-
nantly African-American Warren County, North Carolina, over five hundred protes-
tors were arrested).
92. See Gerrard, supra note 12, at 1158; BLUMBERG & GOTTLIEB, supra note 18, at
74.
93. See Schneider, supra note 5. In some circumstances, public fears and aversions
should not determine policy decisions. For example, public outcry over crime often
prompts anti-crime legislation, such as mandatory minimum sentences for drug
crimes, that is counterproductive and unjust. See generally John M. Walker Jr., Loos-
ening the Administrative Handcuffs: Discretion and Responsibility Under the Guide-
lines, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 552 & n.10 (1993) (noting that many judges believe that
the mandatory minimum penalty statutes enacted by Congress are "draconian, condu-
cive to sentencing disparity and, when applied to non-violent offenders, wasteful of
scarce prison space").
However, the authors agree with Gerrard's distinction between opposition to waste
disposal facilities and opposition to housing and social service facilities. Gerrard con-
tends that battles against disposal facilities often have "significantly positive environ-
mental impacts, not only for the particular sites, but for society at large, because they
spur sounder, less wasteful modes of production. In contrast, opposition to housing
and social service facilities has overwhelmingly negative consequences for society."
Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URn. L. J. 495, 522 (1994).
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scientific risk assessment prepared by a corporation or agency to
the diffuse views of certain constituents as a basis for decisionmak-
ing.94 Further, local officials may be more influenced by promises
of short-term economic gains or, in the case of incinerator facilities,
a perceived lasting solution to the garbage crisis, than by the fears
and doubts of local residents. The political process is currently the
most effective method of achieving environmental justice. How-
ever, political efforts to reform the siting process must address the
methods and ideologies of environmental risk assessment as well as
the mechanics of the siting process.
III. Overcoming Citizen Distrust and Incorporating Citizen
Perception of Risk
Gerrard has argued that the "practice of trying to preempt local
control and force disposal facilities on unwilling communities is
much like the medieval practice of bleeding the sick: it is exqui-
sitely counterproductive. ' ' 95 Gerrard has proposed a national siting
procedure for hazardous waste facilities that is based upon the idea
that facilities should only be sited in communities that have genu-
inely chosen-through a referendum-to host them. 96 This pro-
cess would vitiate many of the flaws in the current system since a
community's risk perception would be determinative. If a corpora-
tion failed to persuade the majority of a community that the facility
posed an acceptable level of risk, and the community did not trust
the government regulatory structures, the community could reject
the facility at the voting booth. Gerrard also argues that where a
majority of the community approves a facility, those community
members in strong opposition to it should be bought out by the
facility sponsor.97
In the absence of comprehensive reform, it is in the govern-
ment's interest to ameliorate some of the flaws in the existing pro-
cedures. Under the current system, government attempts to permit
hazardous land uses usually meet with vociferous community op-
position. This results in an expensive and protracted battle, and
more importantly, causes greater distrust and enmity toward the
government. When government incorporates citizens' risk percep-
tions, and hence respects a community veto, peaceful sitings may
94. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the preference of risk
managers for courses of action that produce tangible benefits).
95. Gerrard, supra note 12, at 1170.
96. Id. at 1223-24.
97. Id.
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occur. Only when a community is a full participant in the siting
process-and not merely viewed as a hurdle to overcome through
manipulation or coercion-can a siting be equitable and thus, suc-
cessful. Until government takes a proactive role in ensuring full
community participation, communities must continue to subvert at-
tempts to shut them out of the siting process.
A. 'Counteracting Corporate Misinformation Campaigns
Facility sponsors present the proposed facility in its rosiest
light-often using euphemisms and jargon to mask the nature of
the project.98 Corporations hire sophisticated consulting firms
known for effectively "neutralizing" popular sentiment,99 and may
also hire community leaders as "consultants" which both nullifies
the community leader as a threat to the project and puts a familiar
face in front of the proposed and potentially frightening project.1°°
Many community groups have responded and must continue to
respond by unmasking jargon, ignoring euphemisms and exposing
situations in which community leaders have been co-opted.1 1 On
the national level, Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, a
citizens group, is compiling a "Dictionary of Linguistic Detoxifica-
tion" which gives alternative definitions for technical terms to ex-
pose misleading jargon and euphemisms. 2
A second tactic available to community groups is investigating
the facility sponsor. By connecting with other communities that
have dealt with the sponsor and with national environmental or
citizen groups, community groups can learn whether the facility
sponsor has complied with environmental regulations, anti-trust
laws or securities and corporate regulations. The Freedom of In-
formation Act'0 3 and its state corollaries"0 can also be utilized for
this purpose. Under these laws, federal and state agencies are obli-
gated to provide all non-exempt information in their possession re-
lating to a corporation. Exposing a facility sponsor's history of
violating environmental laws or price-fixing charges can be power-
98. See generally BLUMBERG & GOTrLIEB, supra note 18, at 58.
99. Id.
100. See Schneider, supra note 28.
101. BLUMBERG & GO-rrLIEB, supra note 18, at 73.
102. One example suggested at the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes,
Inc. conference on incineration and used by Gillette & Krier is "body count" as a
substitute for "risk assessment." See Stop Incineration Network Letter from CCHW
(on file with authors); Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1072.
103. See supra note 16.
104. Id.
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ful ammunition to counteract the sponsor's public relations cam-
paign for its facility. The level of distrust many local residents feel
toward corporations will only be exacerbated when campaigns of
misinformation and cooptation are exposed; facility sponsors who
fail to present their proposals honestly cannot be trusted to operate
a facility safely and effectively. Corporations may find that they
will be more successful in siting facilities that involve some level of
risk if they minimize their attempts to obfuscate.
Communities have disseminated information about proposed fa-
cilities and their corporate sponsors through a variety of media,
such as public radio, community newsletters, and even door-to-
door campaigns.0 5 Once a community group has learned about
the facility sponsor and disarmed the corporate public relations
campaign, it may choose to challenge the siting in the administra-
tive review process.
B. Administrative Review and Public Hearings
During the administrative review period, agencies must change
their manner for dealing with community risk perceptions. In the
absence of governmental reform on this issue, communities must
begin to challenge the hegemony of technocratic risk assessment.
Critics of risk assessment contend that it is "voodoo science' 0 6 and
simply a "way of justifying a project already favored by both indus-
try proponents and policy-makers."' 07 Risk assessment, however,
is not invalid if undertaken cautiously, with a realistic sense of its
limitations, and with the full inclusion of the community residents'
multi-dimensional risk perceptions. Government agencies' accept-
ance of a meaningful community role in the risk assessment pro-
cess will add validity to the process and make the resulting
decisions less suspect.
1. Public Hearings
Citizen participation in the primary administrative review period
can occur in numerous ways. First, public hearings and opportuni-
ties for community members to testify or present questions on pro-
posed facilities should be made a part of all environmentally
105. See Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environ-
mental Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 9,
at 33-35.
106. Robert W. Collin & William Harris, Sr., Race and Waste in Two Virginia Com-
munities, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 9, at 103.
107. Id.
QUESTION OF RISK
sensitive siting decisions. Public hearings allow community mem-
bers to hear the facility sponsor's arguments and data, and allow
residents to present their data or to explain their reasons for op-
posing the project. A public hearing is an excellent forum for
agency officials to listen to community residents' risk perceptions.
As discussed in Part II, a number of state hazardous waste siting
programs recognize the importance of local participation and re-
quire public hearings or create special siting boards that include
both experts and local representatives. 10 8
If no official public hearing is held, a community group may
want to organize an unofficial public hearing. This type of guerrilla
theater can both publicize the lack of an official public hearing and
be a source of information for the public and other community res-
idents not directly involved in the organizing group. The unofficial
public hearing can be an effective organizing technique and a
means to garner media attention on a siting issue. 10 9
2. Notice and Comment
When completing an EIS, or the corollary to an EIS in other
siting procedures, agency officials are well-served by directly con-
fronting community members' risk perceptions. If community
members have indicated that a particular facility presents an unac-
ceptable level of risk or that a sponsor is irresponsible and untrust-
worthy, agency officials should address these perceptions fully in
the siting decision. Approving a facility in the face of vociferous
community protests ignites opposition and will likely lead to more
aggressive actions to oppose it, such as civil disobedience and
lawsuits.110
The administrative review period provides for citizen participa-
tion during the notice and comment period for the draft EIS."'
Thus, if the agency has not dealt with public perceptions of risk,
community groups can alert the agency of its failure. While an EIS
is generally long and technical, community experts who master the
technical language often emerge during the siting process and are
108. For a discussion of state hazardous waste management programs, see Godsil,
supra note 24, at 402-08.
109. See generally Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of a Lawsuit: Mak-
ing Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 547 (1988).
110. At the CCHW Conference on Incineration, held on October 18, 1993, many
community leaders stated that they were convinced that corporations and government
officials respond only to civil disobedience and negative media attention.
111. For NEPA, see 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19; for states, see, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CON-
SERV. LAW §§ 8-109 (4), (6).
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willing to wade through the EIS.1 2 Lawyers and other experts who
work for community groups can assist local residents in EIS inter-
pretation by explaining terminology and answering questions.
Luke Cole suggests the EIS can be an organizing technique
whereby local residents gather in small groups with an attorney or
expert to educate themselves, examine the EIS and write com-
ments for inclusion in the official record.113 Other means of influ-
encing agency officials and local politicians involved in the siting
process include holding unofficial town meetings, staging press
conferences and establishing newsletters to disseminate
information.
The goal during this process is to assess the arguments made and
data presented by facility supporters. If the community decides
that the arguments are weak and the data insufficient to quell its
fears and concerns, it must argue that position publicly and use any
opportunity to communicate with agency decisionmakers. The
agency's goal is similar: to assess the arguments made by both
sides to determine whether the project serves the community's best
interests. Even if the technical arguments favoring the project are
sound, the intense and genuine concern of community residents
should prevail, lest the community feel compelled to up the ante by
filing a lawsuit or engaging in demonstrations, protests and civil
disobedience.
Despite the best efforts of community members, the final EIS
may be insufficient. At that point, the community may wish to file
a lawsuit with the help of a local legal services attorney or an
outside environmental or civil rights organization." 4 The bases
upon which a lawsuit may be filed include procedural violations,
such as inadequate opportunity for notice and comment, a failure
to address public and agency comments, 115 or failure to make the
EIS available in a language the majority of community members
speak. 116 A lawsuit may also be filed on the ground that the facility
112. BLUMBERG & GOTTLIEB, supra note 18, at 77 (neighborhood groups led the
fights against incineration often "led by housewives and other residents who lacked
professional expertise, and who were quickly obliged to master the technical jargon,
complex regulations, and the arcane world of health risk analysis.. . ") (citing William
Glaberson, Coping in the Age of NIMBY, N.Y. TiMES, June 19, 1988).
113. See Cole, supra note 25, at 675-79.
114. Id. at 673-82.
115. See, e.g., Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Evans, 688 F. Supp. 579, 584-85 (W.D. Wash.
1987) (finding administrative record deficient because agency's memorandum deci-
sion not to prepare EA or RIS did not address public and agency comments).
116. See El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991).
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failed to meet one or more of the necessary permit criteria, or that
the agency failed to consider substantive challenges to the proposal
or did not adequately discuss the environmental impact of the pro-
posed action on the area.117 A successful challenge to an EIS
means that the agency will be required to complete an adequate
EIS that remedies the procedural deficiencies and complies with
the substantive requirement that the agency "adequately consid-
ered and disclosed the environmental impacts of its actions" and
made a decision that was not "arbitrary or capricious."",, Rework-
ing an EIS may not lead to a different decision, but it gives a com-
munity time to organize and build support and raises the costs of
going ahead with the facility. Because many facilities are built in
response to a projected need, such as expected waste volume, or
for a target market, a delay may also allow a change in the market
to render the facility obsolete or unnecessary. 119
State procedures to include public participation in the siting pro-
cess do not by themselves overcome either public fear of certain
facilities or public distrust of government. Certain waste manage-
ment procedures that industry and government have supported
create greater risks than originally expected. 2 ° Moreover, public
distrust of government regarding environmental protection has
built up over years and will take time to ameliorate.
C. Federal Action and Its Role in Waste Management
The federal government has a significant role to play in over-
coming public distrust and ensuring environmental protection. Af-
ter twenty years of environmental regulation, the federal
government has failed to meet many of the goals outlined in the
federal environmental laws enacted in the 1960s and '70s.121 More
significantly, however, many poor people and people of color in-
volved in the environmental justice movement feel that environ-
mental laws have been enforced to their detriment; they feel a
117. See, e.g., Marble Mountain Audubon Soc'y v. Rice, 914 F.2d 179, 182 (9th Cir.
1990) (stating that agency did not discuss environmental effects of action on area).
118. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983).
119. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing how citizens' groups can
raise siting costs through delays).
120. See, e.g., Test Burn Data Show Dioxin Emissions Higher Than Expected From
WTI Incinerator, 24 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 346 (June 25, 1993).
121. Barry Commoner, A Reporter at Large: The Environment, THE NEW YORKER,
June 15, 1987, at 46.
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greater level of protection has been provided for white, affluent
neighborhoods than their own.122 Thus, the federal government
must actively seek to regain its legitimacy as protector of the envi-
ronment on behalf of all citizens.
The federal government is taking steps in these directions. It is
recognizing the potential for racism or bias and public distrust of
government regarding waste disposal generally.'23 The federal
government is also becoming aware of the effect that distrust of
government has on the effectiveness of government waste disposal
programs. 124
The government has recognized that even vigorously monitored
and regulated hazardous waste management requirements do not
solve long term hazardous waste problems. As a result, the EPA
has established a "temporary capacity freeze" for hazardous waste
incinerators and has asserted source reduction as its primary
goal.1 25
Second, the White House is chairing an interagency task force on
environmental justice and has signed an executive order requiring
"each Federal agency [to] make achieving environmental justice
part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmen-
tal effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority popu-
lations and low-income populations.' 26 The order requires each
federal agency to develop an environmental justice strategy to:
(1) promote enforcement of all health and environmental stat-
utes in areas with minority populations and low-income
populations;
(2) ensure greater public participation;
122. Cole, supra note 25, at 641-54; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SIT-
ING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILL AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND
ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 52 (discussing the formation of EPA's En-
vironmental Justice Advisory Council and federal investigations of discriminatory en-
forcement of environmental laws) and 69 (discussing the Department of Energy's new
willingness to redress harms from past nuclear programs).
124. See 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 416 (July, 1993) (discussing Department of
Energy conclusion that the public distrusts its handling of radioactive waste and re-
port recommending means to garner public trust).
125. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFT STRATEGY FOR COMBUSTION OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE IN INCINERATORS AND BOILERS: INTERIM FINAL GUIDANCE ON
WASTE MINIMIZATION FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATORS (May 18, 1993) (re-
printed in 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 157 (May 21, 1993)).
126. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629, § 1-101 (1994).
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(3) improve research and data collection relating to the health
of and environment of minority populations and low-income
populations; and
(4) identify differential patterns of consumption of natural re-
sources among minority populations and low-income
populations.127
The EPA's office of Civil Rights is also investigating possible dis-
crimination against financially disadvantaged and minority commu-
nities in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in
Iberville Parish, Louisiana and Noxubee County, Mississippi. 12
The EPA's investigation of these two communities will focus on
whether race was a factor in Mississippi's and Louisiana's efforts to
permit a hazardous waste project in poor and primarily African-
American communities, and also, whether the dumps would ex-
pose the population to disproportionately high health and environ-
mental risks.12 9 The EPA is thus investigating the disparate impact,
as well as possible discriminatory intent, that poor and minority
communities face in relation to waste disposal facilities.
It will, of course, take more than a committee, an executive or-
der, and a few investigations to reassure financially disadvantaged
people and people of color that the federal government is regulat-
ing on their behalf, and that environmental laws are not disparately
enforced. Moreover, the impetus for the current actions are years
of effort by community groups, civil rights organizations and grass-
roots environmental groups. 130 Environmental justice advocates
recognize that they must keep the pressure on; the federal govern-
ment, if it intends to take the issue seriously and regain citizens'
trust, must respond. The EPA, however, despite their environmen-
tal justice investigations, continues to rely heavily upon traditional
risk assessment methodologies.' 3' For the federal government to
effect meaningful change in the siting process and waste manage-
ment generally, it must do more to incorporate citizens' risk per-
ceptions into its risk calculations and its regulations.
127. Id.
128. See Schneider, supra note 28.
129. Id. (regarding Mississippi); Lavelle, supra note 11.
130. See generally Dorceta E. Taylor, Environmentalism and the Politics of Inclu-
sion, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 9, at 53.
131. See Goleman, supra note 5.
1994]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
IV. Conclusion
No changes in the siting process can eliminate conflicts over the
proper location of hazardous facilities or ensure agreement over
acceptable levels of risk; people will always have reasonable dis-
agreements on these questions. Nor will reform eliminate the dis-
parities in economic and political power between large
corporations and government entities on the one hand and small
towns or neighborhoods on the other. However, the recognition
that disagreements over risk are reasonable, and that public per-
ceptions are entitled to as much deference as expert assessments
will help lessen the friction and mistrust that is a hallmark of the
siting process. Giving local communities more autonomy over sit-
ing decisions may appear to raise substantial barriers to siting haz-
ardous or unwanted facilities, but Gerrard suggests this may not be
the case if communities are given substantial incentives to accept
facilities and states are given substantial incentives to help facilities
be sited equitably.132 Indeed, local control over siting may lower
siting costs by reducing the local opposition generated by feelings
of lack of control and mistrust of outside corporate or governmen-
tal decisionmakers. Most importantly, such reforms will go a long
way towards restoring the dignity and rights of democratic partici-
pation that many local communities have lost through the effects of
past and present siting decisions that failed to consider their partic-
ular perceptions and situations.
132. See Gerrard, supra note 12, at 1176-80.
